Showing posts with label secrecy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label secrecy. Show all posts

Home Office vs. WhatsApp Encryption

Tuesday, 2 May 2017

Last month, the British government's home secretary Amber Rudd launched a crusade against the encrypted messaging service WhatsApp. Because WhatsApp was reportedly used by Khalid Masood – the man responsible for the Westminster terror attack – Rudd suggested that she would like encryption to be banned, saying that “a secret place for terrorists to communicate” could not be permitted.

For several years the government has been pushing a similar line, arguing that there can be no “safe space” allowed for terrorists to communicate. The position is controversial because the real outcome of such a policy would mean no “safe space” for anyone to communicate; terrorists are not the only people who use WhatsApp. The service has more than a billion users, the majority of whom are ordinary citizens who just want to be able to chat privately and securely with friends and family.

Rudd's statement cast a shadow of blame over WhatsApp for Masood's atrocity. But because he was not under surveillance at the time of his attack, and is believed to have acted alone, even if WhatsApp were not encrypted it is unlikely that the security services would have been in a position to prevent his rampage. And it was not the case that his communications were entirely beyond the reach of the police, as Rudd implied they were. Investigators were reportedly able to recover WhatsApp messages from his phone in the aftermath of the incident.

These facts did not stop Rudd's posturing, however. She used the incident as an opportunity to call a meeting in the Home Office with what she described as a “fairly long list” of technology companies. Among those invited were internet giants Google, Microsoft, Twitter, and Facebook, whose policy officials published a joint letter after the gathering pledging a commitment to do more to remove terrorist propaganda from their services. But who else attended the meeting is a mystery. Curiously, the Home Office's security and counter-terrorism department is refusing to release the details, and told me last week in response to a Freedom of Information Act request that the names have to stay secret on national security grounds:

Disclosure of the information in scope of your request would reveal those organsistions [sic] that are working with the Home Office to combat terrorism especially in the online space. By releasing the names, we are informing the public which sites host the most content and therefore potentially providing information that could make it easier for those searching for this material to locate it on the internet. This would serve to undermine the Prevent Strategy, and hence weaken and prejudice the national security of the UK. There is a serious terrorist threat to the United Kingdom and disclosure of the information requested could put national security at risk by jeopardising or negating the Government’s efforts to prevent acts of terrorism and terrorist related crime.

It added that information is also subject to commercial confidentiality agreements:

Releasing the information about individuals provided in confidence would breach confidential commercial relationships with the Home Office and could result in breach of confidence action against the Home Office. It would also damage our standing in dealing with individuals who would not have confidence to engage with us in future, and may decide to take action against us.

Both of these claims are perplexing. First of all, it is hard to understand how merely naming a technology company could somehow increase the terror threat or encourage people to seek out terrorism-related content that is hosted by it. Any disturbed individual who is looking for a bomb-making manual or Islamic State propaganda magazine can find it with a few cursory Google searches if they so wish. That is the nature of the internet. The Home Office will not make the problem any better or worse by disclosing the names of technology companies it is meeting with.

The second point, on confidentiality, is equally tenuous. Companies that the government has “commercial relationships” with are paid for by the taxpayer. Therefore, there is no good reason why the details of the contract should not be disclosed. Quite the contrary, there is good reason that the contract should be disclosed, as taxpayers have a right to know how their money is being spent. In this instance I was not even seeking specific contractual details – I was merely asking for a list of companies that attended a meeting. But this was deemed unacceptable to the Home Office, which like many other British government departments is obsessed with secrecy and routinely refuses to release even the most banal information just because it can.

Notably, one thing the Home Office did acknowledge in its response to me was that “the meeting did not cover encryption” and instead “focused on the issue of online terrorist content.” So after the stink Amber Rudd made about banning “secret places” and cracking down on WhatsApp, for the time being she seems to have backed down on the issue.

I am appealing the decision to withhold the company names – and will update here when I have more news on the case.

Year in Review

Monday, 5 January 2015

Well, 2014 turned out to be quite a year. For me, it was a really productive one, and I was lucky enough to get the opportunity to work on some great projects. Below are a few personal highlights that I've put together as a sort of 'year in review', along with a list of notable stories and developments in the realm of surveillance and national security, some 'ones to watch' for 2015, and a few awards that I've decided to hand out for dishonourable government conduct, just because there was so much of it over the last twelve months, and the worst offenders deserve some recognition...

(I meant to post this last week, but I've been on a remote Spanish island on holiday with no internet connection... so here it is, better late than never...)
 
January to March

In January I worked with Canadian broadcaster CBC to reveal details about domestic surveillance in the Canada. In February, The Intercept launched, and I contributed to a story that revealed some new details about US and UK government efforts to target WikiLeaks. In March, I had a report out shining a light on how the US National Security Agency has worked alongside its UK partner Government Communication Headquarters to infect large numbers of computers across the world with malware. I also worked on a story exposing the NSA's targeting of innocent system administrators as part of its covert attempts to hack into communication networks.

April to June

In March, I worked with German news magazine Der Spiegel on a story revealing new details about the NSA's surveillance of world leaders. In April, I reported on British spies' attempts to get broad unsupervised access into NSA troves of surveillance data. And in June, I worked with some great reporters at Danish newspaper Dagbladet Information to reveal new information showing how the NSA forms secret partnerships with countries across the world in order to help significantly expand its surveillance reach.

July to September

In August, the US military banned its personnel from reading The Intercept, and a few days later we published one of the most important stories I've worked on to date, exposing a vast US surveillance search system used to share huge troves of private data among dozens of US government agencies, including domestic law enforcement. The story revealed the decades-long history of US agencies' use of masses of metadata to monitor people's behaviour, and exposed how the CIA was using metadata to aid its efforts to secretly kidnap terror suspects (a practice that often resulted in the suspects — some of whom were totally innocent — being brutally tortured).

In September, we began reporting details at The Intercept about the scope of surveillance in New Zealand, and shined a light on deceptive statements made by the government there about its spying efforts; meanwhile, police raided and ransacked the home of the excellent investigative reporter that we were (and are) working with on Snowden revelations related to New Zealand.

October to December

In November, I worked on a story revealing how one of the most sophisticated pieces of malware ever discovered — dubbed "Regin" by security experts — was linked to cyberattacks perpetrated by British spies against Belgian telecommunications company Belgacom and European Union offices. This piece was an interesting one to work on in that it combined both news reportage with malware analysis — something that's never been done before in journalism, I think — and was published alongside downloadable samples of the Regin malware.

In December, I had a new report out revealing a secret NSA program that involves spying on emails sent among hundreds of mobile phone companies around the world, a practice that helps the agency hack into phone networks. The story exposed how the NSA targeted a London-headquartered trade group that represents tech giants like Microsoft and Facebook, and provided evidence that NSA had been working to insert security vulnerabilities into global telecommunications infrastructure so that they can be exploited for surveillance.

Also in December, I reported new details about the GCHQ hack of Belgian telecommunications company Belgacom as part of a reporting collaboration with newspapers in Belgium and the Netherlands. This particular story is one that I am especially proud of; it was the culmination of about six months of work, and took a huge amount of cooperation with different teams operating out of four separate countries simultaneously. We were able to tell the full story of the British hack on Belgacom, a hugely significant incident representing an unprecedented cyberattack by one EU member state on another. The story included new 'smoking gun' evidence showing that the Regin malware samples contained code-names that also appeared in secret GCHQ documents obtained from whistleblower Edward Snowden.

Vital stories

Here a list of some reports and developments that stood out to me in 2014:

NSA collects millions of text messages daily in 'untargeted' global sweep, The Guardian, 16 January.

Snowden docs show UK spies attacked Anonymous, hackers, NBC News, 4 February.

The NSA’s secret role in the US assassination program, The Intercept, 10 February.

Optic Nerve: millions of Yahoo webcam images intercepted by GCHQ, The Guardian, 27 February.

NSA surveillance program reaches ‘into the past’ to retrieve, replay phone calls, Washington Post, 18 March.

Top EU court rejects EU-wide data retention law, BBC News, 8 April.

Death from above: how American drone strikes are devastating Yemen, Rolling Stone, 14 April.

Turkish president approves law widening secret service's powers, Reuters, 24 April.

The NSA is recording every cell phone call in the Bahamas, The Intercept, 19 May.

Germany arrests man suspected of spying for US, BBC News, 4 June.

NSA: Inside the five-eyed vampire squid of the Internet, The Register, 5 June.

Vodafone reveals existence of secret wires that allow state surveillance, The Guardian, 6 June.

US officials scrambled to nab Snowden, hoping he would take a wrong step. He didn’t, Washington Post, 14 June.

GCHQ sanctions spying on every Facebook, Google and Twitter user, The Telegraph, 17 June.

In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the foreigners who are, Washington Post, 5 July.

Germany to spy on US for first time since 1945 after ‘double agent’ scandal, The Independent, 7 July.

Meet the Muslim-American leaders the FBI and NSA have been spying on, The Intercept, 9 July.

Hacking online polls and other ways British spies seek to control the Internet, The Intercept, 14 July.

The secret government rulebook for labeling you a terrorist, The Intercept, 23 July.

CIA Admits improperly hacked into Senate computers, Washington Times, 31 July.

Barack Obama’s secret terrorist-tracking system, by the numbers, The Intercept, 5 August.

The Islamic State (documentary), Vice, 7 August.

German spy company helped Bahrain hack Arab Spring protesters, The Intercept, 8 August.

Photos of alleged 9/11 '20th hijacker' can stay classified: court, Reuters, 2 September.

MRAPs and bayonets: what we know about the Pentagon's 1033 program, NPR, 2 September.

The NSA and GCHQ campaign against German satellite companies, The Intercept, 14 September.

Israel's NSA scandal, New York Times, 16 September.

Wikileaks releases FinFisher files to highlight government malware abuse, The Guardian, 16 September.

The NSA and me, The Intercept, 2 October.

Citizen Four (documentary), 10 October.

Why was the NSA chief playing the market? Foreign Policy, 22 October.

MI5 spied on leading British historians for decades, secret files reveal, The Guardian, 24 October.

In Cold War, US spy agencies used 1,000 Nazis, New York Times, 26 October.

Secret manuals show the spyware sold to despots and cops worldwide, The Intercept, 30 October.

Brazil is keeping its promise to avoid the US Internet, Gizmodo, 30 October.

Disguised as climate negotiators, Dagbladet Information, 1 November.

UK intelligence agencies spying on lawyers in sensitive security cases, The Guardian, 7 November.

FBI says it impersonated AP reporter in 2007 case, AP, 7 November.

Americans’ cellphones targeted in secret US spy program, Wall Street Journal, 14 November.

WhatsApp now provides end-to-end encryption for your messages, Gizmodo, 18 November.

Before Snowden, a debate inside NSA, AP, 19 November.

US firms accused of enabling surveillance in despotic Central Asian regimes, The Intercept, 20 November.

How Vodafone-subsidiary Cable & Wireless aided GCHQ’s spying efforts, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25 November.

CIA torture report, 9 December.

WikiLeaks CIA leaks, 18 & 21 December.

Inside the NSA's war on internet security, Der Spiegel, 27 December.

The Sabu Files, Vice/Daily Dot.

Save our sources campaign, The Press Gazette.

Ones to watch in 2015

Some things worth keeping an eye on...

A new US cybersecurity unit that will advise agencies on surveillance operations.

Details about a secret database being used by federal agents in the US, the existence of which has become the subject of dispute in an ongoing court case.

Information about documents being shredded en masse in a UK police anti-corruption investigation.

Developments in the US government's ongoing criminal investigation into WikiLeaks, which may have involved the use of a prominent informant.

The long-overdue publication of a government-commissioned post-Snowden review of UK surveillance operations.

The US government using state secrecy powers to block the release of files from anti-Iran group.

Renewed 'crypto wars' as law enforcement agencies in the US push for more powers to combat privacy-protecting encryption technologies.

More details about the CIA's hacking of Senate computers.

A continuing government effort to introduce new laws bolstering surveillance powers in the US, UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

Many more stories from the Snowden documents related to secret spying conducted by the US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and other countries.

Now for a few awards...

Because I feel like handing out some dubious accolades:

Bullshit statement of the year

Winner: Recently retired GCHQ spy chief Sir Iain Lobban for his claim in October that the agency doesn't engage in "anything remotely resembling mass surveillance." A completely false statement that could not be further from the truth.

Runner-up: UK home secretary Theresa May for "collection of bulk data is not mass surveillance."

3rd prize: former US vice-president Dick Cheney for "we were very careful to stop short of torture."

Dishonourable mentions: former NSA and CIA chief Michael Hayden for "I didn’t do anything wrong"; New GCHQ spy chief Robert Hannigan for "GCHQ is happy to be part of a mature debate on privacy in the digital age."

Orwellian euphemism of the year

New Zealand's prime minister John Key tries and fails to make mass surveillance palatable to the public in September by re-branding it "mass protection."

Outrageous admission of the year

Former NSA and CIA chief Michael Hayden tells an audience at Johns Hopkins University in April: "We kill people based on metadata."

Understatement of the year

President Barack Obama, in August, on the CIA's brutal human rights abuses post 9/11: "We tortured some folks."

Gaffe of the year

UK foreign secretary Philip Hammond, who is responsible for signing off on GCHQ surveillance operations, illustrates that he doesn't have a clue what he's been approving during a parliamentary hearing in October.

Hypocrite of the year

Michael Hayden, the CIA chief who overseen the agency's secret extrajudicial kidnapping operations that involved imprisoning and torturing terrorism suspects, some of whom were entirely innocent,  complains in December that a Senate report criticising CIA torture methods was like being "tried and convicted in absentia. We were not given an opportunity to mount a defense."

Most bizarre mass surveillance justification of the year

UK prime minister David Cameron explains to British lawmakers in January that fictional TV crime dramas demonstrate the need for new dragnet spying powers.

Most absurd response to surveillance revelations of the year

A special joint award that goes to the Canadian prime minister's parliamentary secretary, Paul Calandra, and John Key, New Zealand's prime minister. Instead of addressing the substance of revelations about secret government spying in 2014 (that I was involved in reporting), Calandra and Key both resorted to weird and childish petty insults, calling my colleague Glenn Greenwald a "porn spy" (Calandra) and a "loser" (Key).

Villain of the year

UK police and security agencies for establishing a precedent that means journalism — the mere publication of facts and opinions — can now be considered terrorism; for working to secretly identify journalists' confidential sources; and for eavesdropping on lawyers' privileged communications.

Extraordinary Rendition and the Secret Role of Metadata

Thursday, 28 August 2014

On Monday, I had a new story out at The Intercept revealing a secret search engine that the National Security Agency built to share a massive amount of data with other US government agencies, including domestic law enforcement. There are many new and important details scattered through the piece. But there is one in particular I would like to take a minute to focus on here, because it is a fact that strikes at the heart of the debate about government surveillance and deserves some more attention.

In one of the classified documents that we published with the story, dated from 2005, the NSA outlined some of the "successes" of a data-sharing project called CRISSCROSS that was led by the Central Intelligence Agency. The document shows that metadata collected about communications was integral to the CIA's extraordinary rendition program during the Bush Administration, which involved kidnapping terror suspects and taking them to secret "black site" jails where they would be brutally interrogated and sometimes tortured. The NSA document says:

Since 9/11, the contributions to the GWOT [global war on terror] due to our increased collection of signaling metadata are innumerable and significant. It is safe to say that it has been a contribution to virtually every successful rendition of suspects and often, the deciding factor.

This is an incredible detail. Remember, metadata is not the audio content of a phone call or the words contained within the body of an email message. It is merely information showing who you have contacted and when. Governments have often sought to defend the mass-scale collection of metadata by insisting that it is not information that is sensitive or very private. In June last year, President Obama tried to dismiss concerns about metadata collection in the United States by claiming that "nobody is listening to your telephone calls." But, clearly, the government doesn't need to be listening to your calls to deem you a threat. That metadata has been the deciding factor in targeting people for extraordinary rendition is a profound illustration of that — and it shows that metadata collection has real-world ramifications: it is not just some benign activity.

You might think, "well, I'm not a terror suspect so what do I care?" But this is not only about the Bad Guys — there are much wider consequences at play here. During the height of the extraordinary rendition program, for instance, some of the people targeted were victims of what was called "erroneous rendition." In other words, the CIA would kidnap the wrong person. (Yes, seriously.) In 2005, it was reported by the Washington Post that the CIA's inspector general was investigating a "growing number" of erroneous renditions, with some anonymous government officials saying that they believed there were as many as 30 instances of it having taken place.

Much is still unknown about these cocked-up renditions because the information has been kept secret. But now that we know metadata played a key role in targeting people — in some cases even being the "deciding factor" — questions must surely be asked about whether this method was ever to blame. From a legal and human rights perspective, it is disturbing enough that the CIA was secretly kidnapping, imprisoning, and then torturing people. But the possibility of innocent individuals being targeted on the basis of their metadata trail clearly adds a chilling extra dimension. It is a policy of guilt by association that bears all the hallmarks of a kind of terrible and flawed style of totalitarian policing.

Today, the practice of extraordinary rendition appears to have been largely phased out by President Obama. But the concerns raised by the use of metadata to target people are still highly pertinent. Indeed, as The Intercept reported back in February, metadata is actively being used to target and kill terror suspects in drone strikes in countries like Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. One military source said that the method can result in the "wrong people" being bombed. And if you think that sounds far-fetched — that the US would not launch missiles at people because of their metadata — you don't need to take my word for it. Just go and listen to what former CIA and NSA chief Michael Hayden has to say. As he boasted in April: "We kill people based on metadata."

GCHQ's Dubious Role in The 'Quantum' Hacking Spy Tactic

Thursday, 12 December 2013

I've not posted here for a while, but I've got a good excuse. For the last month or so I've been out in Brazil working on a series of stories with the American journalist and former Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald. We've been reporting a series of revelations about government surveillance based on the trove of files leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

I've had some time to take a breather tonight and I want to draw attention to something important in one of the latest stories we worked on with a team of excellent Swedish journalists from Uppdrag Granskning — an investigative unit that operates as part of Sweden's national public broadcaster SVT.

We worked on several stories with Uppdrag Granskning in the lead up to an hour-long documentary, aired Wednesday, about Sweden's major role in the global surveillance nexus that is led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the other members of the so-called Five Eyes group — Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

As we reported, the documents reveal how Sweden has become a key partner for the US and the UK, and top-secret agreements have been made in the last decade that bolster Sweden's spying role like never before.

But aside from these crucial details, which are hugely important for Swedish citizens to be informed about, I'd like to highlight here one smaller piece of information that we reported that I think is highly notable.

Earlier this year, it was disclosed that UK spy agency GCHQ was involved in hacking into the Belgian telecom company Belgacom's computer systems in order to covertly gather intelligence on unknown targets. But what is interesting is that, despite being involved in using these hacking methods, GCHQ has been worrying behind the scenes about their legality.

One of the Snowden documents we revealed on the Uppdrag Granskning documentary — dated circa April 2013 — shows the NSA describing a so-called 'Quantum' hacking initative that GCHQ was involved in at a "proof-of-concept" level. However, the document notes:
Continued GCHQ involvement may be in jeopardy due to British legal/policy restrictions, and in fact NSA’s goal all along has been to transition this effort to a bilat with the Swedish partner. [Emphasis added.]
This struck me because, last year, I uncovered a document showing something similar. In obscure technical standards meetings with telecom companies about implementing new surveillance capabilities, GCHQ representatives from a little-known unit of the agency called the National Techical Assistance Centre were voicing the same concerns about hacking techniques.

At meetings held between 2010 and 2011 in Estonia and Italy, at which a GCHQ representative was present, the UK was said to be anxious about the legality of performing a so-called 'man-in-the-middle' attack to covertly hack and eavesdrop on communications:
An additional concern in the UK is that performing an active attack, such as the Man-in-the-Middle attack proposed in the Lawful Interception solution...may be illegal. The UK Computer Misuse Act 1990 provides legislative protection against unauthorised access to and modification of computer material. The act makes specific provisions for law enforcement agencies to access computer material under powers of inspection, search or seizure. However, the act makes no such provision for modification of computer material. A Man-in-the-Middle attack causes modification to computer data and will impact the reliability of the data.
This could not be clearer. The UK's position was that it might be unlawful for authorities to hack a computer in order to monitor communications and/or exfiltrate data. That was the position in 2010/11, and I think the same concern is what is being referenced in the 2013 NSA document when UK "legal/policy restrictions" are mentioned.

Yet despite this concern — and this is perhaps the most important point — GCHQ has marched ahead with its participation in clandestine surveillance operations that involve hacking. The Belgacom case is a specific example, but the NSA documents on Sweden illustrate that Belgacom was not an isolated case. GCHQ was (and likely continues to be) involved in a program called WINTERLIGHT that explicitly involves trying to infect hundreds of targeted computers with so-called 'implants' of malware. GCHQ even operates a covert computer server that it uses to help infect targets with the malware, likely by masquerading as legitimate websites such as LinkedIn, as previous reports have suggested. These covert servers are mentioned in one of the NSA documents on Sweden, dated April 2013, revealed by Uppdrag Granskning:
Last month, we received a message from our Swedish partner that GCHQ received FRA [Swedish spy agency] QUANTUM tips that led to 100 shots, five of which were successfully redirected to the GCHQ server.
So, the question here is: how can this be legal? If GCHQ was previously concerned that performing active hacking attacks may be unlawful under the UK's Computer Misuse Act, then how has that situation been resolved? Has the agency been granted immunity to perform these operations? If so, who granted the immunity? Alternatively, has the UK government, with zero public debate and under cover of total secrecy, produced a classified interpretation of the law aimed at justifying and rendering lawful the use of this clandestine hacking technique?

Another very intriguing theory I have considered is that GCHQ lets one of the other agencies do the "dirty work" — the part of the hack that would illegal under UK law. The NSA may deploy the malware, for instance, while GCHQ plays a lesser role by merely facilitating the attack by hosting the server — but still reaping the benefits (i.e. it gets access to the intercepted data). Having spent countless hours now looking at the Snowden documents, it certainly appears to me that this is something that occurs — that the spy agencies circumvent their domestic laws by allowing partner agencies to do things that they could not do themselves.

Either way, GCHQ's clear and undeniable role in Quantum hacking attacks raises hugely significant legal questions and it is remarkable to me — but perhaps not totally surprising — that the blundering British parlimentarians who are supposed to hold the agency to account have thus far failed to raise any of these key issues.

The NSA's Prism & its Capabilities

Saturday, 8 June 2013

It has been two days now since the Guardian and the Washington Post reported that the US National Security Agency has "obtained direct access to the systems of Google, Facebook, Apple and other US internet giants, according to a top secret document." As part of a surveillance program called Prism, the NSA and the FBI, the Post reported, are "extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs that enable analysts to track foreign targets."

But since the initial reports, the Internet companies have all denied this "direct access" claim [1], which prompted the Guardian on Saturday to publish the secret source document showing the NSA's description of Prism as program enabling "collection directly from the servers of these service providers: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, Paltalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, Apple."

So what exactly is Prism and how does it work?

In my view, it is possible too much has been read into the NSA's description of Prism as enabling "collection directly from the servers." Taken in isolation, this statement does not necessarily mean that the NSA has direct and unrestricted access to these companies' central computers to sift through troves of private data whenever they feel like it, which is what the initial reporting seemed to imply. "Collection directly from the servers" could feasibly mean Prism is the codename the NSA uses for a "separate, secure portal" that is linked to or located within the servers of these companies. As the New York Times reported on Friday:

[I]nstead of adding a back door to their servers, the companies were essentially asked to erect a locked mailbox and give the government the key, people briefed on the negotiations said. Facebook, for instance, built such a system for requesting and sharing the information, they said. [...] In at least two cases, at Google and Facebook, one of the plans discussed [with the government] was to build separate, secure portals, like a digital version of the secure physical rooms that have long existed for classified information, in some instances on company servers. Through these online rooms, the government would request data, companies would deposit it and the government would retrieve it, people briefed on the discussions said.

This could still be understood as "collection directly from the servers," but the distinction is that it is not "open-ended access." Under this system, the NSA — or the FBI on behalf of the NSA — would obtain a court order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and use it to demand the respective company turn over various data into its "separate, secure portal." The scale of the data grab, though somewhat limited in scope by the court order, could still be huge. As was separately disclosed earlier this week, for instance, a single FISA order can be used to obtain millions of phone records.

The confusing thing about this picture of Prism, however, is that it still conflicts a little bit with how the system was portrayed by the newspapers that reported on the secret documents. The description of a "separate, secure portal" like an "online room" where companies "deposit" data for the government suggests that the transaction happens in static, incremental stages: data is requested by the government, data is passed over by the company, then the government sifts through it. But the Washington Post's reporting suggests the transaction does not occur in static stages because it can involve real-time monitoring:

According to a separate “User’s Guide for PRISM Skype Collection,” that service can be monitored for audio when one end of the call is a conventional telephone and for any combination of “audio, video, chat, and file transfers” when Skype users connect by computer alone. Google’s offerings include Gmail, voice and video chat, Google Drive files, photo libraries, and live surveillance of search terms.

Additionally, the source who disclosed the document, described as a career intelligence officer, told the Post: “They quite literally can watch your ideas form as you type.”

So this means that if the companies are not providing "direct access" to their servers to mine data indiscriminately, then the "separate, secure portal" can also be used not just to "deposit" data, but also to obtain access to real-time communication flows, presumably authorized by a FISA order and implemented by the respective company that receives it (Google, Apple, Facebook, etc). Indeed, in a statement Sunday, the US director of national intelligence James Clapper said in a statement that Prism was authorized under Section 702 of FISA and he described the program as an "internal government computer system used to facilitate the government's statutorily authorized collection of foreign intelligence information from electronic communication service providers."

The question, then, is how sweeping the FISA orders are. The Post reported that "from inside a company’s data stream the NSA is capable of pulling out anything it likes" and also said that the NSA's spies use Prism through a "Web portal" that entails entering “'selectors,' or search terms, that are designed to produce at least 51 percent confidence in a target’s 'foreignness'." This suggests to me that we are talking about dragnet FISA orders that oblige the companies to turn over huge amounts of data, some in real time, handled by the NSA on a system codenamed Prism, which may involve the NSA having its own "secure portal" within or at least linked to company servers.

The companies would not know that they were participating in anything named "Prism" — that is just the NSA's internal codename for the program. From the companies' perspective, all they are doing is responding to court-authorized FISA orders. What I would like to hear each of the companies publicly explain is whether they have any kind of interface for facilitating government FISA orders built within or linked to their server infrastructure. (See this update below.)

I should note that all of the above is my own speculation based on an analysis of the available facts. Other theories I have heard proposed include that the NSA has essentially secretly "hacked" the respective companies' servers by spoofing encryption certificates. But I think that is far-fetched and that what I have suggested here is likely more in line with what is happening, though, again, I am only speculating. Without access to the full leaked source documents, it is difficult to comprehensively analyse the details. Only a fraction of the secret documents has been published so far, presumably for legal and/or editorial reasons. There are reportedly 41 top-secret leaked PowerPoint slides in total related to Prism but only about four or five have been made available by the Guardian and the Post. It is my hope that they will all surface eventually so we can get a better and more accurate understanding of what this controversial surveillance program entails.

*****

[1] Facebook said it does not "provide any government organization with direct access to Facebook servers." Apple said "we do not provide any government agency with direct access to our servers." Microsoft said "If the government has a broader voluntary national security program to gather customer data we don’t participate in it.” Yahoo said "We do not provide the government with direct access to our servers, systems, or network.” Paltalk said it "does not provide any government agency with direct access to its servers.” AOL said that it does not "provide any government agency with access to our servers.” And Google, too, said that it had "not joined any program that would give the U.S. government — or any other government — direct access to our servers."

*****

UPDATE, 9 June 2013: A new report from the Washington Post has some additional interesting details about Prism. The Post has spoken with anonymous executives at some of the companies linked to the program, who "acknowledged the system’s existence and said it was used to share information about foreign customers with the NSA and other parts of the nation’s intelligence community." The report adds:

According to slides describing the mechanics of the system, PRISM works as follows: NSA employees engage the system by typing queries from their desks. For queries involving stored communications, the queries pass first through the FBI’s electronic communications surveillance unit, which reviews the search terms to ensure there are no U.S. citizens named as targets.

That unit then sends the query to the FBI’s data intercept technology unit, which connects to equipment at the Internet company and passes the results to the NSA.

PRISM allows “collection managers [to send] content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations,” rather than directly to company servers. The companies cannot see the queries that are sent from the NSA to the systems installed on their premises, according to sources familiar with the PRISM process.

This seems in line with my theory above about the functionality of the system — that it is a "secure portal" within or at least linked to the companies' servers. What is particularly notable is the role of the FBI in reviewing the search terms, and the fact that the companies apparently do not see what the NSA is searching for. I think this hammers home the point regarding the sweeping scope of the FISA orders, which we need to know much more about. Even without any further information, however, it is clear to me that Prism has huge ramifications — in particular for all non-US citizens using services like Gmail, Skype, and Hotmail.

Jack Straw, MI6, and Extraordinary Rendition

Thursday, 14 March 2013

There was a very interesting interview aired this evening on Channel 4 News with former UK foreign secretary Jack Straw, which touched on the British government's role in the Iraq War and alleged complicity in kidnappings and torture.

First, some important context.

In 2004, a Libyan Islamist militant anti-Gaddafi fighter Abdel Hakim Belhadj and his pregnant wife were abducted at a Bangkok airport and "rendered" to Libya by American agents. Belhadj was taken to one of Gaddafi's prisons and says he was subjected to torture.

At the time, British government officials were publicly denying any role in so-called "extraordinary rendition" — the practice used frequently by the United States under the George W. Bush administration involving kidnapping terror suspects and taking them to secret locations in third countries where they were sometimes brutally interrogated. But amid the revolution in Libya in 2011, a trove of classifed documents were found during the raid of a government office revealing British spy agency MI6 had in fact played a role in rendition — providing crucial intelligence that resulted in Belhadj being handed over to Gaddafi.

MI6 did not deny involvement when the documents were discovered: instead, UK government sources insisted the agency's actions were part of "ministerially authorised government policy." Then, in April last year, the Sunday Times reported that Jack Straw — foreign secretary between 2001 and 2006 — had been forced by MI6 to admit he had signed off on the secret rendition of Belhadj.

A few days after the Sunday Times report, Belhadj, who is now a military commander in the new Libya, launched legal action against Straw for alleged complicity in illegal rendition and torture.

Now, to the interview.

Tonight, on Channel 4 News, Straw made some eyebrow-raising statements to reporter Alex Thomson in light of the above. Previously he has declined to comment on the Belhadj case, and he told Channel 4 that he wouldn't discuss specifics. But he did make several short remarks that seem significant:

Thomson: It seems extraordinary to have to ask this question... but is the kidnapping and torturing of people by nation states wrong?

Straw: Of course it's wrong and we had no part in that.

Thomson: Are you sure we had no part in it?

Straw: Absolutely. It is wrong. It is absolutely wrong for any of that to have happened.

Thomson: And you are sure that the UK government had no part in it, that's what you just said?

Straw: Well, I'm absolutely sure that I had no part in this, let's just be clear about this OK, and there is going to be a full-scale judicial-led inquiry on the wider issues.

So Straw was clear. "I'm absolutely sure that I had no part in this," he said. Here is what the Sunday Times reported last year:

JACK STRAW, the former Labour foreign secretary, admitted that he had approved the secret rendition of a terrorist suspect to Libya after MI6 showed him evidence proving he had signed off the operation, well placed sources say.

Straw, who faces questioning by police over claims by Abdel Hakim Belhadj that he was tortured in a Libyan prison after being seized in 2004, was confronted by Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officers after publicly appearing to deny he had authorised rendition.

Asked about Britain’s rendition policy during an interview on BBC Radio 4 last autumn, Straw said: “The position of successive foreign secretaries, including me, is that we were opposed to unlawful rendition, opposed to torture or similar methods and not only did we not agree with it, we were not complicit in it, nor did we turn a blind eye to it."

According to well-placed sources, within days of those comments MI6 officers met Straw. “They reminded him [Straw] that he had signed off on it. He was shown evidence and [then] he did accept that he had signed off on the rendition," said one insider.

Straw has repeatedly declined to comment publicly on the Belhadj case. This weekend a spokesman for him said: “I think that you will readily understand that while an investigation is pending, it is not appropriate for Mr Straw to respond to queries like yours."

And here is a timeline of the key events:

6-8 March 2004: Abdel Hakim Belhadj and his wife Fatima Bouchar are abducted at a Bangkok airport and flown to one of Gaddafi's prisons in Libya.

13 December 2005: Jack Straw, then foreign secretary, tells MPs in response to concerns about rendition: "Unless we all start to believe in conspiracy theories and that the officials are lying, that I am lying, that behind this there is some kind of secret state which is in league with some dark forces in the United States, and also let me say, we believe that Secretary Rice is lying, there simply is no truth in the claims that the United Kingdom has been involved in rendition full stop, because we have not been."

4 September 2011: Documents are found by Human Rights Watch inside the abandoned office Gaddafi's former intelligence chief, Moussa Koussa. One file contained hundreds of secret letters and faxes that UK spy agency MI6 and US spy agency the CIA had sent to Koussa, some revealing "evidence that British intelligence agencies mounted their own 'rendition' operation in collaboration with Muammar Gaddafi's security services." One document showed MI6 counter-terror chief Mark Allen boasting to Koussa about helping render Belhadj in 2004. “The intelligence was British," Allen wrote, adding that assisting in rendering Belhaj by providing information about his movements was “the least we could do for you and for Libya."

5 September 2011: Straw tells BBC Radio 4 in response to the discovery of the documents: “The position of successive foreign secretaries, including me, is that we were opposed to unlawful rendition, opposed to torture or similar methods and not only did we not agree with it, we were not complicit in it, nor did we turn a blind eye to it."

8 April 2012: Extensive details on the rendition of Belhadj and his wife emerge in a special report published by the Guardian. It opens: "Just when Fatima Bouchar thought it couldn't get any worse, the Americans forced her to lie on a stretcher and began wrapping tape around her feet. They moved upwards, she says, along her legs, winding the tape around and around, binding her to the stretcher. They taped her stomach, her arms and then her chest. She was bound tight, unable to move."

15 April 2012: The Sunday Times reports that following Straw's Radio 4 appearance in September 2011, officers from MI6 met with him. A source told the newspaper: "They reminded him [Straw] that he had signed off on it [the rendition of Belhadj]. He was shown evidence and [then] he did accept that he had signed off on the rendition."

18 April 2012: Belhadj launches legal action against Straw over alleged complicity in illegal rendition and torture.

14 March 2013: Straw claims in an interview aired by Channel 4 News that he is "absolutely sure that I had no part in this [extraordinary rendition and torture]."

*****

It doesn't take a genius to see that something does not add up here. There are clear inconsistencies between statements made publicly by Straw and the secret documents, and Straw's Channel 4 interview today contradicted both the secret documents and the claims published by the Sunday Times. The long-delayed judge-led inquiry into the UK's involvement in rendition cannot begin soon enough.

*****

UPDATE, 4 April 2013: It is reported that Straw and former MI6 spy chief Mark Allen say "they cannot respond to allegations of conspiracy in the torture of a prominent Libyan dissident [Hakim Belhadj], pleading the need to protect official secrets." Court documents seen by the Guardian show the former foreign secretary is arguing that the law means he "can neither confirm or deny [MI6] operations," claiming he cannot plead in the case without "causing real harm to the public interest."

However, Straw does explicitly deny misleading parliament in 2005 with his statement that Britain had not "been involved in rendition full stop." Straw claims, according to the Guardian's report, that:

it was 'readily apparent' ... that the committee at the time was discussing 'extraordinary rendition' — that is, rendition specifically carried out for the purposes of torture.

This denial strikes me as tenuous in the extreme, because when you read Straw's full 2005 statement to the parliamentary committee it is not at all clear that when he is talking about rendition he is only talking about rendition in the context of torture. Indeed, he even says at one point that "rendition is a term of art which covers a variety of activities," before going on to add: "there simply is no truth in the claims that the United Kingdom has been involved in rendition full stop, because we have not been." Of course, we now know that the UK was involved in rendition, at the time when Straw was the foreign secretary and thus the responsible minister.

*****

UPDATE II, 22 December 2013: A long-delayed UK government report on British spy agencies' complicity in rendition and torture is finally released on 19 December. The report finds that MI6 turned a "blind eye" to the torture of detainees and was not under any obligation to report breaches of the Geneva Convention. In response to the publication of the report, Jack Straw issues yet another denial, saying in a statement to parliament:

as Foreign Secretary, I acted at all times in a manner that was fully consistent with my legal duties and with national and international law, and that I was never in any way complicit in the unlawful rendition or detention of individuals by the United States or any other state.

The following day, on 20 December, the UK High Court rejects Abdel Hakim Belhadj's rendition and torture case against the government, which Straw was reported to have signed off on. Astonishingly, the judge says that while Belhadj appears to have a "potentially well-founded claim that the UK authorities were directly implicated in the extraordinary rendition," the case cannot proceed because pursuing it would "jeopardise national security." Belhadj is now trying to appeal against the decision.

*****

UPDATE III, 12 November 2015: Citing ongoing Supreme Court proceedings, The Guardian reports that Straw and former MI6 spy Sir Mark Allen "could avoid prosecution over complicity in the rendition and torture" of Belhadj and his wife by claiming immunity in the case.

Saudi Drone Base Blackout

Thursday, 7 February 2013

Yesterday it was widely reported that the United States has been operating "secret" drone base in Saudi Arabia since 2011. Not only that, but some American news organisations had known about the base for more than a year and chose not to disclose its existence because of a blackout agreement made with the government.

Here's a snippet from the Washington Post's report:

The Washington Post had refrained from disclosing the location at the request of the administration, which cited concern that exposing the facility would undermine operations against an al-Qaeda affiliate regarded as the network’s most potent threat to the United States, as well as potentially damage counterterrorism collaboration with Saudi Arabia.

The Post learned Tuesday night that another news organization was planning to reveal the location of the base, effectively ending an informal arrangement among several news organizations that had been aware of the location for more than a year.

But the logic here doesn't stack up. Why? Because on 26 July 2011 a story was published by the London Times titled "Secret drone bases mark latest shift in US attacks on al-Qaeda." This report revealed the existance of a CIA drone base in Saudi Arabia, and even went as far as to speculatively pinpoint its exact location:

The CIA has set up a network of secret drone bases in Arab states in a major escalation of its campaign against al-Qaeda militants in Yemen.

Sources in the Gulf say the agency is now massed along Yemen’s borders, launching daily missions with unmanned Predator aircraft from bases in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. [...]

“Oman, Saudi and the UAE are being used as bases for drones. The operation against al-Qaeda has been stepped up in Yemen and in Somalia,” said a Gulf defence source. [...]

A senior Gulf intelligence source believes the most likely base in Saudi Arabia is at Khamis Mushayt in the southwest. The site has been used by Saudi forces for airstrikes against Houthi rebels in northern Yemen. A possible alternative is Sharurah in the kingdom’s Empty Quarter, close to the Yemeni border but considered less secure.

What this means is that the information the United States government was pressuring American reporters to keep secret was already in the public domain — it had already been "outed," as it were, and it hadn't damaged counter-terrorism operations or the relationship with Saudi Arabia. Anyone with an Internet connection — and yes, that includes members of al-Qaeda — could find out that the CIA had a "secret" drone base in Saudi Arabia simply by doing a quick Google search. (Even though the Times story is behind a paywall, the first few paragraphs, which include the Saudi detail, can still be viewed for free.)

Defending the decision not to publish this information after some criticism, Washington Post reporter Greg Miller posted a tweet today saying: "For the record, WaPo has reported CIA drone base on Arabian peninsula since 2011, w/out disclosing it was in Saudi." I asked him why not disclose the specific country when it had already been published elsewhere, and he responded: "Short answer: US govt concerned more about US press than British, and saying on Arabian peninsula puts readers pretty close."

I think this shows poor judgement. It seems flawed to make a distinction between the British and American press here, especially in the age of the Internet. All news stories published online are distributed instantly to an international audience. By disclosing the existence of an "Arabian peninsula" base while suppressing the exact country in question — even though it is already in the public domain — not only are you serving no substantive purpose but you are doing your readers a disservice.

In national security journalism, difficult decisions often have to be made under incredible pressures. Sometimes, there can be a legitimate need to keep a certain military operation undisclosed if, for example, lives are at stake. But in this case I think the American press got it wrong. Unfortunately, it comes off looking like another example of deference to power that will ultimately taint the reputations of the newspapers involved.

Guantanamo's Anonymous Censor

Sunday, 3 February 2013

When a suspected terrorist mastermind goes on trial at the Guantanamo Bay military commission, strange things can happen.

Last week, midway through the pretrial hearings for five accused 9/11 plotters, an anonymous outside censor unilaterally blacked out an audiovisual feed that provides public access to journalists reporting on the proceedings. The incident frustrated the military judge, who is supposed to have total control over the courtroom, and in the process illustrated the acute tension between open justice and obsessive-compulsive national security secrecy.

Here's how it went down, according to Jason Leopold, a reporter for Truthout who was in attendance:

...the audio feed to the proceedings was interrupted Monday when defence attorney David Nevin, who represents [accused 9/11 planner Khalid Shaikh] Mohammed, discussed the title of an exhibit pertaining to the CIA's secret black site prisons, where the self-professed 9/11 mastermind and his alleged co-conspirators had been held prior to their transfer to Guantanamo.

When Nevin uttered the word "secret," a warning light, which is silent, positioned on the judge's dais, started to flash and the sound of white noise was fed through the audio feed. Moments later, the monitors inside the gallery went black. The outage lasted three minutes. (The courtroom is visible to members of the gallery but is separated by soundproof glass; the audio feed is delayed by 40 seconds).

The judge, Col. James Pohl, was not happy about the act of censorship because he had not approved it. "If some external body is turning the commission on or off based on their own views of what things ought to be, with no reasonable explanation ... then we’re going to have a little meeting about who turns that light on and off," he said, reported the Huffington Post.

The fascinating debacle raised a number of questions, most importantly: who was this mysterious outside censor, watching proceedings from outside the courtroom and able to hit a "white noise" button on a whim? Leopold's report offers the closest thing to an answer:

It was later revealed by the government that the third party monitoring the hearings who was responsible for the interruption ... was the "original classification authority," or OCA, likely a reference to the CIA since that is the agency that operated the black site prisons.

But the government refused to provide information about whether the censor had been monitoring proceedings from a room at Guantanamo or was in fact located somewhere in the United States (like, say, the CIA's headquarters at Langley, Virginia).

"Who is the invisible hand?" asked one of the defence attorneys, not content with the lack of clarity. "Who is the master of puppets?"

It's a question that's difficult to answer with 100 percent certainty, given the secrecy. But whoever was responsible, he or she is not likely to be hitting the blackout button again any time soon. On Thursday judge Pohl ordered the government to unplug any outside censors. “This is the last time that will happen,” he said. “No third party can unilaterally cut off the broadcast.”

A rare triumph for transparency, it seems.

[You can a detailed report about the case, United States v. Mohammed, et al., here, courtesy of the Public Record.]